We analyze the performance of various communication protocols in a generalization of the Crawford-Sobel (1982) model of cheap talk that allows for multiple receivers. We find that the sender prefers communicating by private messages if the receivers' average bias is high, and by public messages if the receivers' average bias is low and the receivers are sufficiently polarized. When both public and private messages are allowed, the sender can combine the commitment provided by public communication with the flexibility of private communication and transmit more information to the receivers than under either private or public communication scenarios. When the players can communicate through a mediator and the receivers are biased in the same direction, it is optimal for the sender to communicate with the receivers through independent private noisy communication channels.
The paper most related to ours is Farrell and Gibbons (1989) . They compare private and public communication in a cheap-talk model where there are two possible states of the world and each receiver has two possible actions. For this model, Farrell and Gibbons introduce the classification of the equilibria of private and public communication games that we use in Section 3.4. However, in our model, unlike theirs, the possible cases can be conveniently interpreted as depending on whether the sender's audience is polarized or homogeneous, extremist or moderate. Also the Farrell and Gibbons model is not rich enough to address some interesting questions. In particular, because their model has only two states, the sender has only two possibilities in a pure-strategy equilibrium: either to reveal the truth completely, or to reveal nothing at all. On the other hand, in our model it is possible to have a situation where the sender communicates some information under either communication protocol, but the informativeness of the statements differs across protocols. Finally, the Farrell and Gibbons model is not well-suited for studying combined private and public communication.
In coincident work, Koessler and Martimort (2008) provide a partial comparison of private and public communication. They do not allow for combining private and public communication, or analyze the optimal communication protocol. In another recent work, Golosov et al. (2008) study a one sender, one receiver cheap-talk model where the receiver has to take several actions over time. The two-period version of their model can be interpreted as a special case of our model, where the sender engages in combined communication with two identical receivers. They describe equilibria similar to our Examples 1 and 2.
Environment
There are three players, one sender and two receivers. The sender observes the state of the world θ ∈ Θ = [0, 1], while the receivers do not observe θ . The common prior over the states of the world is a continuous distribution F on Θ. Each receiver i can choose an action a i ∈ R.
We assume that the utility function of the sender is u(a 1 , a 2 , θ) = −l 1 (|a 1 − θ|) − l 2 (|a 2 − θ|), where l i is twice continuously differentiable with l i (x) > 0, l i (x) > 0, ∀x > 0, and the utility function of receiver i is v i (a i 
where b i ∈ R. Given these preferences, the sender's most preferred actions in state θ are a 1 = a 2 = θ ; receiver i's most preferred action is a i = θ + b i . The utility of each party in state θ decreases in the distance from the preferred action(s) given θ to the action(s) that is(are) actually taken. A special case are the quadratic preferences (l i (x) = L(x) = x 2 , i = 1, 2), which are assumed in many applications. 4 Before the receivers take their actions, the sender can send them payoff-irrelevant messages (cheap talk). We consider three ways to organize communication: public communication, private communication and combined communication. When communication is public, the sender is allowed to send only messages that are publicly observed by both receivers. When communication is private, the sender is allowed to send individual messages to each receiver. When communication is combined, the sender can send both public and private messages. In all these scenarios the receivers are not allowed to communicate either with each other or with the sender. 5 In Section 5 we discuss more complicated communication arrangements: communication through a mediator and communication where the receivers actively participate in the conversation (long cheap talk). The aim of the paper is to compare equilibria of various modes of communication and find the communication arrangement that maximizes the sender's ex ante utility.
For an equilibrium of a given game between the sender and the receivers, a function a : Θ → (R 2 ) will be called the equilibrium outcome function if the probability distribution over the actions of the receivers for the sender of type θ in this equilibrium is given by a(θ ) ∈ (R 2 ). When we say that a(θ ) = a ∈ R 2 , we mean that type θ gets the vector of actions a for sure.
Pure modes of communication

Examples
Suppose the utility function of the sender is −(a 1 − θ) 2 − (a 2 − θ) 2 , the utility function of receiver i is −(a i , and consider the private communication game. Since the sender's utility is separable in the actions of the two receivers, and neither of the receivers is affected by the other receiver's action, the sender in effect faces two 'separable' information transmission problems, one with each receiver. Therefore in equilibrium the sender will communicate with each receiver as she would if the other receiver was not present (Proposition 1). Since the interests of receiver 1 are perfectly aligned with the sender's, it is incentive compatible for the sender to tell receiver 1 exactly what the state is. However, the bias of receiver 2 is so large that it will be impossible for the sender to communicate any information to him in any equilibrium. Let us now consider the public communication game. Intuitively, since the sender is restricted to sending a public message which will be seen by two receivers with different interests, the sender should treat the two receivers as a single audience whose interests lie somewhere between the interests of the two receivers. Indeed, it is possible to prove (Proposition 2) that the sender should act as if she is facing a single receiver whose bias is the average of the two receivers' biases. In this case, the average is equal to 1 4 , which means that all equilibria with public communication will be uninformative. To summarize, in case of private communication, the sender is able to transmit her information perfectly to receiver 1 but no information to receiver 2, while in case of public communication she is unable to transmit any information to either receiver. The high bias of receiver 2 subverts the possibility of informative public communication in this example. Therefore private communication is better than public for the sender: it provides the sender with the ability to tailor the message to the personality of the receiver, which may be valuable if the receivers have different preferences.
However, it is not always the case that this ability is beneficial for the sender. To illustrate, suppose b 2 = 1 2 as above, but
. Now the sender will not be able to transmit any information to any of the receivers in the private communication game, because both biases are too high in absolute value. However, the average bias is equal to 0, so the public communication game has an equilibrium where the sender's message is perfectly informative of the state. This phenomenon is called mutual discipline: the presence of receiver 1 disciplines the communication with receiver 2 and vice versa, making the sender's public announcement of the state credible. In other words, the fact that the message is public can be viewed as a commitment device for the sender, allowing her to sustain perfectly informative public communication when no information transmission through private communication is possible.
The comparison of public and private communication for the sender becomes more complicated when both modes of communication admit informative equilibria. Suppose b 1 = 0 and b 2 ∈ (
). As in the first example, the best private communication equilibrium involves full revelation of information to receiver 1 and no information to receiver 2. But the average of receivers' biases is now low enough to allow for existence of a public communication equilibrium with two distinct informative messages. This is the case of one-sided discipline: some information can be credibly transmitted to a biased receiver 2 because of the presence of an unbiased receiver 1. , public communication is sufficiently informative to outweigh the benefits of private communication. Fig. 1 : the horizontal axis measures b 2 ; the vertical axis measures 
This is illustrated in
1 (b 2 ) 2 (U private (b 2 ) − U public (b 2 )),
Private communication
In this section we consider Bayesian-Nash equilibria of the following private communication game. At the first stage, after observing the state θ the sender sends two messages, m 1 and m 2 , to the receivers. Receiver i is able to observe only the message m i . At the second stage, receivers independently choose their actions a 1 and a 2 .
6 A sender's strategy in this game maps the states into probability distributions over pairs of messages. Receiver i's strategy maps the messages into actions.
7
As in the example in Section 3.1, we show that the sender will communicate with each receiver in private as she would in a model where only that receiver is present. Let us introduce the Crawford-Sobel (CS) game between one sender and one receiver. The sender privately observes the state θ ∈ [0, 1] distributed according to F (θ). She can send one payoff-irrelevant message to the receiver, who then takes an action a ∈ R. The utility functions of both parties depend on the state and the receiver's action. 
. Crawford and Sobel (1982) characterize the equilibria of the CS game under more general assumptions on preferences.
They prove that if b i = 0, there exists an equilibrium where the state is completely revealed to the receiver. If b i = 0, any equilibrium is characterized by a finite sequence of cutoff types 0 = θ 0 < θ 1 < · · · < θ N = 1 such that the equilibrium outcome function is constant on each interval (θ i−1 , θ i ). If there exists an equilibrium of size N, then there also exist equilibria of any size smaller than N. As a consequence, for any fixed value of b i , there exists an equilibrium of the greatest size.
In our model, this translates into the fact that any equilibrium generates two interval partitions of [0, 1], each partition corresponding to an equilibrium of the CS game with receiver i. For any values of b 1 and b 2 , there exists an equilibrium where each receiver takes more distinct actions than in any other equilibrium.
Public communication
In this section we consider Bayesian-Nash equilibria of the following public communication game. At the first stage, after observing the state θ the sender sends a message m that is observed by both receivers. At the second stage, the receivers choose their actions a 1 and a 2 . A sender's strategy in this game maps the states into probability distributions over messages. Receiver i's strategy maps the messages into actions a i . The following proposition establishes that the equilibria of the public communication game have an interval partitional form, like in the CS game. If in addition the sender's loss functions from the interaction with each receiver are identical, like in the example in Section 3.1, then the sender behaves as if she is facing a single 'representative' receiver with the bias equal to the average of the receivers' biases (b = b 1 +b 2 2 ). 6 In cheap-talk games the set of equilibrium outcomes remains unchanged if one uses standard refinements of Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, like Perfect Bayesian equilibrium. See, for example, Section 3 in Farrell (1993) . Though the sender can send a message to each receiver only once, it is straightforward to show that the set of equilibrium outcomes does not change if the sender is allowed to send several messages sequentially, as long as the receivers are not allowed to send messages. See, for example, discussion on p. 153 in Krishna and Morgan (2004) . Similar argument applies to the public communication game considered in Section 3.3.
7 Note that our assumptions guarantee that the equilibrium strategy of each receiver is pure. After any equilibrium message m i , receiver i solves
where F mi is the posterior distribution of θ following message m i . The solution is unique by strict convexity of L.
Proposition 2. 
This function is strictly concave, and since l 1 (|b 1 |) = l 2 (|b 2 |) it is maximized at = 0. Thus the utility from telling the truth is higher than utility from any misreporting ( = 0). There seems to be no natural way to generalize part (ii) of this proposition when l 1 = l 2 except for one special class of environments described next. Suppose the preferences of the sender satisfy l 1 = λl and l 2 = (1 − λ)l, for some loss function l and λ ∈ [0, 1]. If l is quadratic, then it is easy to show that in the public communication game the sender behaves as if she is facing a single representative receiver with a bias b = λb 1 + (1 − λ)b 2 . However if l is not quadratic then such a result does not hold, unless λ = Note also that the public communication scenario, when l i = l for i = 1, 2, can be reinterpreteted as a model of communication with a single receiver whose bias is uncertain. Suppose that there is a sender with utility function −l(|a − θ|) and a single receiver with utility function −L(|a − θ −b|), whereb is either b 1 or b 2 with equal probabilities. The equilibrium characterization given in Proposition 2 is valid for this model. 
One-sided discipline (|b
There exist informative private communication equilibria with only one of the receivers, as well as informative public communication equilibria. This occurs when one of the receivers has a low bias, and the other receiver has a bias that is high enough to preclude the possibility of informative private communication with him, but not high enough to prevent public communication. Proposition 3 below confirms that for quadratic payoffs the same qualitative pattern as in the example in Section 3.1 holds: private communication is better than public as long as receiver i is sufficiently biased.
Communication with both
There exist both informative private communication equilibria with each of the receivers and informative public communication equilibria. The outcomes of the private and public communication equilibria are not equivalent in our model, unless the biases of the receivers exactly coincide. The welfare comparison between public and private communication in this case in general is ambiguous.
The following result provides a partial welfare comparison for cases 4 and 5 when the utility functions are quadratic.
; |b j |, |b| < 
] such that public communication is better than private if and only if
b i ∈ [B(b j ), − 1 4 ] ∪ [ 1 4 , B(b j )]. (ii) Suppose |b 1 |, |b 2 |, |b| < 1 4
(the case of 'communication with both'). Public communication is better than private if |b
The question of whether public or private communication leads to better information transmission has been addressed before by Farrell and Gibbons (1989) in a setting where there are two states of the world, and each of the two receivers has a choice between two possible actions (hereafter the FG model). As in our model, the payoffs to each receiver are independent of the action of the other receiver. Focusing on pure strategy equilibria, Farrell and Gibbons provide conditions for existence of separating equilibria in the private communication game and in the public communication game. They arrive at a classification of cases that is the same as the one used above. In particular, neither in the FG model, nor in our model it is possible to have 'mutual subversion', i.e. a case where there exist informative private communication equilibria with each of the receivers but there are no informative public communication equilibria. This case becomes possible if one goes beyond the cheap-talk model and allows the sender to make certifiable statements (see Koessler, 2008; Ozmen, 2004) .
Farrell and Gibbons study only pure strategy equilibria, but under some circumstances in their model there are interesting mixed strategy equilibria as well. For example, it can be shown that there are mixed strategy public communication equilibria which support some information transmission in cases when neither informative public communication, nor in-formative private communication with either receiver is possible (the 'no communication' case). 10 In contrast, in our model all private and public communication equilibria are essentially equivalent to partitional pure strategy equilibria. Also, in the informative equilibria of our model, the sender may reveal only some but not all the information, which cannot happen in pure strategy equilibria of the Farrell and Gibbons model. So, if both public and private informative equilibria exist in our model, they generally differ in their informativeness and resulting welfare.
Combined communication
Preliminaries
In this section we consider the game where the sender can send both public and private messages, and the receivers are not allowed to communicate either with each other or with the sender. Formally, we consider Bayesian-Nash equilibria of the following combined communication game. At the first stage, after observing the state θ the sender sends a message m that is observed by both receivers. The sender also sends two private messages, m 1 and m 2 , to the receivers, such that receiver i is able to observe only the message m i . At the second stage, receivers independently choose their actions a 1 and a 2 . A sender's strategy in this game maps the states into probability distributions over messages. Receiver i's strategy maps messages into actions.
11 When discussing this game it is convenient to separate the communication stage into two:
public communication stage and private communication stage.
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Because it is always possible to sustain uninformative communication at any stage of the combined communication game, any equilibrium outcome function of either the private or the public communication game can be achieved in an equilibrium of the combined communication game. Therefore, combined communication cannot be worse than private or public communication. We will be interested in whether combined communication can strictly improve on both.
Farrell and Gibbons (1989) do not study combined communication. Moreover, for every equilibrium of the combined communication game in their framework that we were able to find, there exists an equilibrium of either the private communication game or the public communication game that is equivalent or Pareto dominates it. Given the positive results for our model we present in this section, this suggests that the FG model is not well-suited for studying combined communication.
We begin characterizing the structure of the combined communication equilibria by noticing that, conditional on a public message, the private messages partition the state space into intervals.
Lemma 1. Suppose m is a public message sent in a combined communication equilibrium, and suppose Θ(m) is the set of types that send m. Then, for
The lemma is proved by simply noting that, conditional on any public message, the argument for the CS model goes through, and the private messages partition the state space into intervals. The latter statement does not hold for public messages: in Example 2 public messages divide the state space into subsets that are not intervals.
Another property of any equilibrium of the combined communication game is given by the following lemma.
Hence it is natural to distinguish the following two classes of combined communication equilibria.
Definition 1.
A combined communication equilibrium is called monotonic if a 1 (θ) and a 2 (θ) are monotonically nondecreasing in θ ; otherwise it is called nonmonotonic.
Monotonic equilibria
First we show that the equilibria from this class have the interval partition structure.
Lemma 3. Any monotonic combined communication equilibrium is interval partitional.
10 One of the types of the sender mixes between a 'fully revealing' message and a 'pooling' message, while the second type always sends the 'pooling' message. The mixing probabilities are chosen so that the posterior after the 'pooling' message makes one of the receivers indifferent between his actions, so it is possible to choose a mixed strategy for this receiver to support such an equilibrium. The details are available upon request. 11 In this section we focus on equilibria with deterministic outcome functions. Contrary to the public and private communication scenarios, in case of combined communication there may exist mixed strategy equilibria with a non-degenerate random outcome function. 12 It is straightforward to show that the set of equilibrium outcomes does not change if we explicitly introduce the sequential timing for the messages.
See footnote 6 for discussion of a related issue.
Hence in the monotonic equilibria the sender first makes public announcements which partition the state space into intervals, and then further refines the information of the receivers by privately communicating with each of them. Notice that all public communication equilibria and all private communication equilibria belong to this class. Despite the fact that the monotonic equilibria have an intuitive structure, a full characterization of all such equilibria is hard. Instead we settle on deriving a set of necessary conditions for the existence of monotonic equilibria with both informative communication at the public stage and informative communication at the private stage with at least one of the receivers. . Therefore, if a monotonic equilibrium where both the private and the public stages are informative exists, then both the conditions for the existence of an informative public communication equilibrium (as in Proposition 2) and the conditions for the existence of an informative private communication equilibrium with at least one of the receivers (as in Proposition 1) must be satisfied.
Next we consider an example of a monotonic equilibrium which performs strictly better than any public or private communication equilibrium.
). The sender sends two public messages: 'Low' if θ ∈ [0, x) and 'High' if θ ∈ [x, 1], where x = √ 3 − 1 ≈ 0.732. After both public messages, the sender sends an uninformative message to receiver 2. The sender sends a fully revealing message to receiver 1 following the message 'High' and an uninformative message following the message 'Low'. First we show that this communication arrangement constitutes an equilibrium. If the sender follows the strategy described above and the receivers play their best response, the outcome function is as follows:
Let us check incentive compatibility for the sender. Type x is indifferent between sending the public message 'Low' and sending the public message 'High' (and consequently communicating with receiver 1) if
Solving for x, we get x = √ 3−1 as claimed above. The ex ante utility of the sender in this equilibrium is , 1]. The ex ante utility of the sender is − 13 96 ≈ −0.135, which is smaller than the utility in the above combined communication equilibrium.
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Clearly the outcome of this combined communication equilibrium cannot be replicated by any public communication equilibrium, because receiver 1 must have more precise information than receiver 2. The reason why this outcome cannot be replicated by a private communication equilibrium is more subtle. Suppose there was a private communication equilibrium that resulted in the same outcome functions. Then type x would induce the actions (a 1 , a 2 ) = (x,
). But this type has a profitable deviation: it could achieve a higher utility by sending to receiver 1 a message which induces action x, and to receiver 2 a message which induces action . This deviation is unavailable to the sender in the combined communication game, because at the public stage it is made common knowledge whether the state is above or below x. This illustrates the role of having the public communication stage, which is to reduce the number of deviations available to the sender.
Another unusual feature of this combined communication equilibrium is that it prescribes uninformative communication with receiver 1 after the public message 'Low' despite the fact that the preferences of the sender and of receiver 1 are 13 There might be other combined communication equilibria that are better for the sender than the one described above. We do not solve for the optimal equilibrium here, but Proposition 6 describes the optimal mediation protocol for this example. perfectly aligned.
14 Assume for a moment that the sender fully reveals the state of the world to receiver 1 after every public message. In this case, the public messages carry useful information only for receiver 2, and thus every combined communication equilibrium is equivalent to some private communication equilibrium. However, it is impossible to sustain any information revelation to receiver 2 because his bias is too high.
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Next we show that for a range of parameters it is possible to construct a monotonic combined communication equilibrium which outperforms all public communication equilibria from the ex ante perspective of the sender.
Proposition 4. Suppose F is uniform and l i
there exists a monotonic combined communication equilibrium that gives the sender strictly higher ex ante utility than the best public equilibrium.
The proof works as follows. We show that whenever there exists a public communication equilibrium of size N, it is possible to improve the sender's utility by constructing a combined communication equilibrium where the sender sends N public messages which partition the state space into intervals and then communicates informatively with one of the receivers.
Proposition 4 cannot be literally generalized to include private communication equilibria, because for any neighborhood of the zero vector in R 2 , there exists a countable subset of this neighborhood such that whenever (b 1 , b 2 ) belong to that subset, the private communication equilibria result in the highest possible payoff among all possible communication mechanisms (including combined communication equilibria). This statement is made precise in Lemma 5 in Section 5.
Nonmonotonic equilibria
In the nonmonotonic combined communication equilibria the public messages divide the state space into subsets which are not intervals. Let us consider an example of a nonmonotonic equilibrium which performs strictly better than any public or private communication equilibrium or any monotonic equilibrium.
). The sender sends two public messages:
, where x ≈ 0.021 and z ≈ 0.932. The sender sends an uninformative message to receiver 2 after both messages. Following the message 'Outside' the sender reveals to receiver 1 whether θ ∈ [0, x) or θ ∈ [z, 1], and sends an uninformative message following the message 'Inside'.
Let us show that this communication arrangement constitutes an equilibrium. If the sender follows the strategy described above and the receivers play their best response, the outcome function is as follows:
Let us check incentive compatibility for the sender. Type x is indifferent between the 'low' strategy of sending the public message 'Outside', with the consequent revelation to receiver 1 that her type is in [0, x) , and the 'intermediate' strategy of sending the public message 'Inside' if
Type z is indifferent between the 'high' strategy of sending the public message 'Outside', with the consequent revelation to receiver 1 that her type is in [z, 1] , and the 'intermediate' strategy of sending the public message 'Inside' if 14 One may argue that such an equilibrium is unnatural, because the sender has an incentive to communicate further with receiver 1 after the public message 'Low' (Blume and Sobel, 1995 , introduce the notion of 'communication-proof equilibria', which formalizes this idea). Since our goal is to study how various means of communication expand the set of equilibrium outcomes in cheap-talk games, we prefer not to address the issue of equilibrium selection here. See also the discussion following Example 2 below. 15 Note that it is impossible to transmit any information to receiver 2 if the sender sends a fully revealing message to receiver 1 following the message 'Low' and an uninformative message following the message 'High'. The outcome in such an equilibrium would be as follows:
Solving for x, we get x = 1. Hence the resulting equilibrium is equivalent to the best private communication equilibrium, which involves full information revelation to receiver 1 and uninformative communication with receiver 2. ≈ −0.292, which is smaller than the utility in the above nonmonotonic combined communication equilibrium.
Let us outline the logic behind the constructed equilibrium. Since both receivers have high positive biases, the sender is tempted to pretend to be a low type. To support informative communication, we need to reduce the sender's desire to do so. In the constructed equilibrium, the 'low' strategy of sending the public message 'Outside' with the consequent revelation to receiver 1 that her type is in [0, x) deviate to the 'low' strategy, because the resulting low action of receiver 1 is counterbalanced by the relatively high action of receiver 2. Similarly, the 'high' strategy of sending the public message 'Outside' with the consequent revelation to receiver 1 that her type is in [z, 1] results in the action pair (a 1 , a 2 ) ≈ (1.216, 0.991); the unattractive high action of receiver 1 is counterbalanced by the action of receiver 2, so high types of the sender do not deviate to the 'intermediate' strategy.
As in Example 1, the key ingredient which allows to sustain informative communication in this equilibrium is that we handicap the sender in her ability to communicate with one of the receivers. If the sender is forced to reveal to receiver 2 whether the state is in [0, x) or (z, 1], then the construction breaks down and the resulting equilibrium is equivalent to an uninformative equilibrium. 16 To some extent, this feature of the equilibrium is a familiar one: in many dynamic settings the parties want to commit to ex post inefficient outcomes for some states of the world in order to support outcome functions which are Pareto superior in the ex ante sense. In our situation, commitment in the literal sense is not required, because the uninformative outcome at the private stage of communication is self-enforcing. There is a large literature that aims at constructing an equilibrium refinement that picks the most informative equilibrium in cheap-talk games. 17 In our environment, refining away less informative equilibria of some subgames may result in an ex ante Pareto inferior outcome.
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Equilibria of this sort can also be naturally sustained in the environments where the sender is unable to communicate privately with some of the receivers. For example, a firm may have an ability to hold a private meeting with a lender (or with a union), but be unable to communicate privately with numerous equity holders. Suppose that the firm is able to schedule a private meeting with the lender, and the equity holders observe whether the meeting is scheduled but do know what is discussed at the meeting. The firm schedules a meeting only in the extreme situations, i.e., when the business conditions are either very good or very bad, and at the meeting the firm reveals to the lender which one is the case. Thus the scheduling of the meeting plays the role of the public message 'Outside', and the absence of the meeting plays the role of the public message 'Inside'. The assumption that no private meeting between the firm and the equity holders takes place is non-controversial because it is plausible to assume that the lender could always send a spy there.
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Another key feature of our equilibrium is that the sender's message strategy with receiver 1 differs from the message strategy with receiver 2, and thus the receivers are induced to take different actions even though their preferences are identical. Such an effect can be replicated in a model with a single receiver if two-stage communication is possible, as shown by Krishna and Morgan (2004) . Indeed, assume that the sender and a single receiver with the bias of further information is revealed. This constitutes an equilibrium with the same values of x and z as above. Following 'heads', the receiver behaves as receiver 1 from our example, and following 'tails' he assumes the identity of receiver 2. Instead of an access to a coin, we could assume that the receiver is allowed to participate in the conversation with the sender, and thus they can perform a jointly controlled lottery which replicates the coin. 20 We continue the discussion of the benefits of such conversations in Section 5. 16 The resulting equilibrium is equivalent to a public communication equilibrium of size N = 3, but we know that the public communication game has only uninformative equilibria. 17 See for example Chen et al. (2008) and the references therein. 18 This is also a feature of environments with multiple communication stages; see, for example, Aumann and Hart (2003) and Krishna and Morgan (2004) . 19 Another setting where such equilibria are natural is when there is a single receiver who has to take several actions over time (Golosov et al., 2008) .
While the information revealed by the sender in first period is 'publicly observed' by both first-and second-period receiver, the information revealed by the sender in the second period is 'privately observed' by the second-period receiver only. Nonmonotonic equilibria can also arise when the receiver observes a noisy signal of the state (Chen, 2009) . In this case, the 'private' message corresponds to the value of the signal and is outside of the sender's control. 20 See Aumann and Hart (2003) for a discussion of jointly controlled lotteries.
Next we generalize the message of Example 2. We show that for a range of parameters it is possible to construct a nonmonotonic combined communication equilibrium.
exists a non-trivial nonmonotonic combined communication equilibrium.
In the proof of this result we show that there always exists a nonmonotonic combined communication equilibrium of the same form as in Example 2 as long as the preferences of one of the receivers are closely aligned with the preferences of the sender. This is a surprising finding, because in both public equilibria and monotonic combined communication equilibria it is possible to communicate some information to an extremely biased receiver only in the situations of 'mutual discipline', i.e. when the average bias is small enough (Proposition 2 and Lemma 4). In the constructed nonmonotonic equilibria the public messages are informative for any value of the average bias.
We do not claim that the constructed nonmonotonic equilibria are generally better for the sender than other communication arrangements. However, Example 2 shows that there are situations when this is the case.
Mediated communication and long cheap talk
Mediated communication
In this section we introduce the possibility of mediated communication, whereby the players communicate with a neutral trustworthy party (the mediator) who then sends back private messages to the players. The mediator does not know the state of the world and does not have the power to impose what actions the players are to take.
The value of studying mediated communication is twofold. First, it is interesting to find out when it is beneficial to invite an outside mediator to facilitate communication between the players. Second, according to the revelation principle (Myerson, 1982) , any equilibrium outcome of any communication protocol (mediated or unmediated) can be replicated by the procedure whereby the sender secretly reports the state of world to a neutral trustworthy mediator, who then makes non-binding private recommendations (possibly stochastic) to each receiver of what action to take. Hence, when looking for the optimal (according to some criterion) communication protocol, it is enough to optimize within this class. After that one can check whether the outcome can be replicated by some unmediated communication protocol.
Formally, a mediation rule is a family (p(·|θ)) θ∈Θ , where for each θ ∈ Θ, p(·|θ) is a probability distribution on the space of action pairs R 2 . Given a mediation rule, the game proceeds as follows. At the first stage, after observing the state θ , the sender privately reports a stateθ to the mediator. Upon hearing the report from the sender, the mediator selects the individual recommended actions a 1 and a 2 according to p(·|θ) and privately announces them to each receiver. The revelation principle implies that without loss of generality reporting the true state should be optimal for the sender, and obeying the mediator's recommendation should be optimal for each receiver. The mediation rules that have an equilibrium where the sender always reports the truth and each receiver always obeys the recommendation will be called incentive compatible.
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We are looking for incentive compatible mediation rules that maximize the ex ante utility of the sender, and focus on the case when F is uniform and the payoffs are quadratic. Definition 2. An optimal mediation rule p = (p(·|θ)) θ∈Θ is a family of probability distributions on R 2 that solves the following problem:
The constraints (IC-S) say that the sender should find it optimal to tell the truth. The constraints (IC-R) state that each receiver has no incentive to deviate from the action that is recommended to him by the mediator. The right-hand side of the equality is the expectation of θ given the recommendation a i corrected by the bias of receiver i, which is the action that maximizes the payoff of receiver i when the mediator recommends a i . Given p(a 1 , a 2 |θ) and the unconditional distribution of θ , E θ [θ|a i ] is determined uniquely up to a zero-measure subset of R.
The optimal mediation rule is characterized by two sequences of cutoff types
, and by two numbers Mediation rules similar to the one in Proposition 6 appeared in the literature on cheap-talk games before. For the CS model with a single receiver, Blume et al. (2007) introduced the mediation rule which is otherwise identical to ours, and Goltsman et al. (2009) proved its optimality. Thus in the cases covered by Proposition 6 the optimal mediation rule with two receivers is equivalent to the twice-replicated optimal mediation rule with a single receiver. It can thus be implemented with the help of two mediators, such that mediator i is allowed to communicate only with the sender and receiver i (in particular, the recommendation of mediator i has to be independent of that of mediator j = i and of the sender's report to mediator j = i). The mediation rules that can be implemented in this fashion will be called private mediation rules. In particular, note that all equilibrium outcomes of the private communication game can be replicated with private mediation rules.
Besides the (IC-S) and (IC-R) constraints, the incentive compatible private mediation rules satisfy the condition that the sender has to report the state of the world truthfully to each of the two mediators. If the optimal mediation rule is private, this means that there are no benefits from pooling together the sender's incentive constraints across receivers. Proposition 6 shows that this is the case when the receivers' biases are of the same sign and of moderate magnitude.
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For the cases when the receivers' biases are of the same sign that are not covered by Proposition 6, the optimal mediation rule is unknown. We conjecture that the optimal mediation rule also belongs to the class of private rules and is equivalent to the twice-replicated optimal mediation rule for the model with a single receiver.
When the receivers' biases are of the opposite sign, the optimal mediation rule is unlikely to be private, because, similarly to the 'mutual discipline' case in private communication, it may now be valuable to pool the sender's truthtelling constraints across receivers. One special class of mediation rules that takes advantage of pooling the sender's truthtelling constraints across receivers is when the mediator recommends actions to each of the receivers publicly rather than in a private manner. Such mediation rules will be called public mediation rules. 23 Note that all equilibrium outcomes of the public communication games can be achieved with public mediation rules. Also, similarly to the case of equilibria of the public communication game, the public mediation rules can be shown to be equivalent (from the point of view of the sender) to a mediation rule between the sender and a single receiver with a bias equal to the average of the two biases, i.e. b =
It is easy to show that if b 1 + b 2 = 0, the optimal mediation rule is public and recommends to receiver i action θ for every θ ∈ Θ. We do not know whether the optimal mediation rules belong to the class of public rules for other values of the receivers' biases. However it is possible to show that the ex ante payoff of the sender from the optimal public mediation rule is higher than from the optimal private mediation rule when the receivers' biases are of the opposite sign and are close in absolute values. 25 Next we show that in some cases neither private nor public mediation rules are optimal. We present an example of a monotonic equilibrium of the combined communication game which performs better than any private or public mediation rule. ). The sender sends two public messages: 'Low' if θ ∈ [0, x) and 'High' if θ ∈ [x, 1], where x ≈ 0.261. The sender sends an uninformative message to receiver 2 after both public messages. Following the message 'Low' the sender to receiver 1 whether θ ∈ [0, t) or θ ∈ [t, x), where t ≈ 0.180, and sends an uninformative message following the message 'High'. 22 More specifically, first we use the (IC-S) and (IC-R) constraints to derive an upper bound on the sender's ex ante utility (see Lemmas 11 and 12 in Appendix A), and then we show that mediation rule given in Proposition 6 achieves this upper bound. 23 Our definition of public mediation rules differs from the one in Lehrer and Sorin (1997) . We assume that the sender submits to the mediator a report about the state of the world, while Lehrer and Sorin (1997) allow for more general reports. 24 See Proposition 2. 25 The proof is available upon request.
This communication arrangement constitutes an equilibrium, and the ex ante utility of the sender is approximately −0.146. The ex ante payoffs of the sender from the best private and the best public mediation rule are approximately −0.151 and −0.149, respectively.
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The optimal mechanism for the case described in Example 3 is not known. However the fact that the given monotonic equilibrium performs better than any private or public mediation rule suggests that the optimal mechanism must both take advantage of pooling the sender's truthtelling constraints across receivers, as well as transmit some of the information to the receivers in a private manner.
Unmediated communication protocols
In this section we discuss whether it is possible to implement optimal mediation rules by some communication schemes between the players without the use of mediator. We begin by noting that under some values of the biases, the optimal mediation rules can be implemented as equilibria of the private communication game described in Section 3. The result follows from the fact that the optimal mediation rule in Proposition 6 becomes deterministic for such values of the biases. Note, however, that when the optimal mediation rule in Proposition 6 is stochastic, then it is not possible to implement it as an equilibrium of any communication protocol from Sections 3 and 4. Since each receiver's best response is always a singleton, the randomization must be performed by the sender, but there can be at most a single type of the sender that is indifferent between any two given actions of receiver i.
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Let us now turn to more complicated protocols with active participation of the receivers. A general model of such protocols, or long cheap talk, was introduced by Aumann and Hart (2003) .
2 . The optimal mediation rule from Proposition 6 can be achieved with long cheap talk.
In contrast, in the game with one receiver, there exists an optimal mediation rule that is implementable with long cheap talk only if the absolute value of the bias is less than . 28 Therefore, the presence of the second receiver makes it possible to extend the range of biases for which there exists an optimal unmediated communication protocol. The reason for this is that it is possible to use each receiver to play the role of a correlation device (as in Forges, 1988) in the communication between the sender and the other receiver. Moreover, this can be done in such a way that a receiver does not learn anything about the state of the world while facilitating communication between the other players.
The construction discussed above does not work when the optimal mediation rule does not belong to the class of private rules. Though there exists a literature which studies the problem of implementing mediated outcomes of Bayesian games as correlated equilibria of long cheap talk protocols (see, for example, Forges, 1990) , to the best of our knowledge it deals with the games with finite action and type spaces. We think that the results from this literature will carry through in our model for mediation rules such that, ex ante, positive probability is placed only on a finite number of lotteries, each with a finite support (such as the optimal mediation rules described in part (i) of Proposition 6).
Conclusion
We have analyzed communication via various protocols between the sender and two receivers in a natural extension of the framework of Crawford and Sobel (1982) . Throughout the paper we have assumed that the payoffs of each receiver are independent of the action of the other receiver, and that the sender's payoff is separable in the actions of the two receivers. Hence the only thing that links two otherwise 'separable' problems of information transmission (one between the sender and receiver 1, and the other between the sender and receiver 2) is the state of the world which is privately known by the sender.
We have identified several means by which the incentives for information transmission can be affected by simultaneous communication with both receivers in this environment. In Section 3 we have shown that using public announcements has a commitment value, because it reduces the number of deviations available to the sender. In Section 4 we have shown that under the combined communication scenario it may be beneficial to reveal less information at the private communication stage in order to improve incentives for information revelation at the public communication stage. In Section 5 we have 26 See Appendix A for calculations. 27 Mitusch and Strausz (2005) emphasize that the advantage of using mediator comes from the possibility to implement stochastic outcomes without imposing constraints that the sender must be indifferent between the receivers' actions. 28 See Theorem 1 in Krishna and Morgan (2004) and Theorem 3 in Goltsman et al. (2009) shown that it may be beneficial to use noisy communication channels, which can be replicated using multi-stage plain conversation protocols between the players.
In the environments where our 'separability' assumptions do not hold, one can expect the following additional effects to come into play. Relaxing payoff independence between the receivers will bring in an element of strategic interaction at the action choice stage. The sender will have to take into account that her message announcements induce a particular information structure into the game to be played between the receivers (which might have multiple equilibria). Relaxing the separability of the sender's payoff in the actions of the receivers will complicate the receivers' inference problem when the messages are private.
One interesting topic for future research is to extend the model to more than two audiences. While we expect that the comparison between the outcomes of games with public communication with all audiences and the games with private communication with each audience to be similar the case of two audiences, there are also many intermediate communication arrangements like organizing the audiences into different groups, so that the messages of the sender are commonly observed by the members of the same group. Optimal design of such groups depending on the preferences of the receivers is an interesting question, and the results of the current paper can serve as a building block in providing the optimal way of organizing communication within any two-member group.
There are other topics for future research that we find interesting. First, one can analyze communication with multiple receivers in an environment where messages are costly. To the best of our knowledge, the existing models of signalling with multiple audiences do not allow for the possibility of private or combined communication. Another avenue for future research is studying communication through other realistic communication channels (for example, using private messages which become publicly known with some probability, or using the 'blind carbon copy' option for private communication). One can also extend our model to allow for communication between the receivers, or for an endogenous choice between communication modes by the sender.
Appendix A
A.1. Proofs of Section 3
Proof of Proposition 2. (i) After any equilibrium message m, receiver i solves 
Therefore the actions of the receivers are related as follows: a 2 − b 2 = a 1 − b 1 . Thus we can rewrite the utility of the sender as depending on a 1 only:
Consider a CS game between a sender with utility function −Λ and a receiver with utility function −L. Since Λ is convex, in every equilibrium of the public communication game, if a 1 is induced with positive probability in equilibrium by types θ and θ , then a 1 must be an equilibrium action for every θ ∈ (θ, θ ). Furthermore, by Lemma 1 in Crawford and Sobel (1982) the set of equilibrium actions is finite if the most preferred actions of the sender and the receiver remain distinct,
, and the above condition can be rewritten as Let (a 1 , a 2 ) be a pair of actions chosen by type θ in a given equilibrium of the public communication game, and (a 1 , a 2 ) be a pair of actions that is chosen by some other type. Then, using (1), it must be the case that Λ(a 1 − θ) Λ(a 1 − θ). Since Λ is convex and symmetric around its minimum, −(
), this condition can be written as
Now consider the CS model with a receiver with the loss function L(|a i − θ − b 1 +b 2 2 |). Let us check that this model has an equilibrium characterized by the same cutoffs. Indeed, if the sender follows the same strategy as in the original equilibrium, the receiver after given message will take the action equal to (a
, where a 1 is the action of receiver 1 in the original equilibrium. By (2), the sender's original strategy is the best response to these actions of the receivers. 2 Lemma 6. Let F be uniform and l 
Proof. By Proposition 2, the equilibrium cutoff types are the same as in the CS game with a receiver with bias b. Using the results of Crawford and Sobel (1982) , the most informative equilibrium is of size N(b) = − 
The ex ante utility of the sender is (the other cases are symmetric). This implies
) and where the first inequality is by the triangle inequality. Thus there exists a public equilibrium of size N. Hence
A.2. Proofs of Section 4
Proof of Lemma 2. Suppose θ > θ. From incentive compatibility for the sender:
Add up and rearrange to get
Note that l i (|x|) > 0 for every x and i = 1, 2. Hence, we cannot have both a 1 (θ ) < a 1 (θ) and a 2 (θ ) < a 2 (θ). 2
Proof of Lemma 3. Suppose the equilibrium is not partitional, i.e. ∃i ∈ {1, 2}, θ, θ ]. Suppose receiver i takes a finite number of actions in equilibrium, say, action a i is taken when θ ∈ (x, y) and a i is taken when θ ∈ (y, z). Because F is uniform,
Since the utility of the sender is separable in the actions of the two receivers, she can optimize over private messages to be sent to receiver i independently of which messages she plans to send to receiver j. Thus type y is indifferent between where the second inequality follows from the proof of (i).
Assume there is informative communication at the public stage, as well as informative private communication only with receiver 1 (the argument for receiver 2 is similar). Then there exist a, x, y, z, c such that 0 a x y z c 1 and receiver 1 gets informed whether θ ∈ (x, y) or θ ∈ (y, z), whether receiver 2 gets informed whether θ ∈ (a, y) or θ ∈ (y, c).
The indifference condition for type y implies (1 − 1 − 3 8
(1 + 2b 2 )), or 0 < ( , 0) a type-I equilibrium exists and yields a strictly higher payoff than the best public communication equilibrium whenever b 1 is close enough to 0.
It is straightforward to prove an analogous statement for b 2 ∈ (0, 1 2 ) using a type-Ib equilibrium of the following kind. Consider a sequence 0 = θ 0 < θ 1 < · · · < θ N−1 < t < θ N = Let us check incentive compatibility for the sender. Type t is indifferent between a strategy of sending the public message 'Low', with a consequent revelation to receiver 1 that her type is in [0, t) , and a strategy of sending the public message 'Low', with a consequent revelation to receiver 1 that her type is in [t, x) if 
